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ventral striatum was similarly activated by pride and shame/
guilt. In the whole-brain analysis, both self-referential emo-
tion conditions activated medial prefrontal and posterior 
cingulate regions, corresponding to the self-referential as-
pect and the autobiographical evocation of the respective 
emotions.  Conclusion: Autobiographically evoked self-ref-
erential emotions activated basic emotional as well as self-
referential circuits. Except for the ventral striatum, emotion-
al circuits were more active with pride than with shame. 
 © 2014 S. Karger AG, Basel 
 Introduction 
 Self-referential emotions are directed to the experienc-
ing persons themselves  [1, 2] . Typically, they particularly 
comprise pride as a positive emotion, and guilt and shame 
on the negative side. The differentiation of guilt and shame 
and the general function of self-referential emotions are 
subjects of a longstanding and ongoing debate  [1–3] . Ac-
cording to some theories  [1–3] , guilt addresses the  actions 
of an individual, whereas shame is related to the individ-
ual  as a whole . However, this differentiation is controver-
sial  [3] as guilt and shame arise together quite often  [3] . In 
addition, some authors emphasize sequential effects  [2] of 
guilt and shame. The aspects differentiating between these 
two emotions are rather inconsistent  [3] . When compar-
ing the so-called ‘basic emotions’, comprising joy/happi-
ness, sadness, anger, disgust and fear  [4–7] , with self-ref-
erential emotions, the following differences can be found:
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 Abstract 
 Background: Self-referential emotions such as shame/guilt 
and pride provide evaluative information about persons 
themselves. In addition to emotional aspects, social and self-
referential processes play a role in self-referential emotions. 
Prior studies have rather focused on comparing self-referen-
tial and other-referential processes of one valence, triggered 
mostly by external stimuli. In the current study, we aimed at 
investigating the valence-specific neural correlates of 
shame/guilt and pride, evoked by the remembrance of a cor-
responding autobiographical event during functional mag-
netic resonance imaging.  Method: A total of 25 healthy vol-
unteers were studied. The task comprised a negative (shame/
guilt), a positive (pride) and a neutral condition (expecting 
the distractor). Each condition was initiated by a simple cue, 
followed by the remembrance and finished by a distracting 
picture.  Results: Pride and shame/guilt conditions both ac-
tivated typical emotion-processing circuits including the 
amygdala, insula and ventral striatum, as well as self-referen-
tial brain regions such as the bilateral dorsomedial prefron-
tal cortex. Comparing the two emotional conditions, emo-
tion-processing circuits were more activated by pride than 
by shame, possibly due to either hedonic experiences or 
stronger involvement of the participants in positive self-ref-
erential emotions due to a self-positivity bias. However, the 
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 – self-referential emotions are said to be more complex 
 [1] ; 
 – self-referential emotions are said to require complex 
preconditions such as language-based self-representa-
tions of the subject and theory of mind  [1] ; 
 – self-referential emotions develop later in childhood 
than basic emotions  [1, 6, 8] , although guilt/shame be-
havior can be observed already in 2- to 3-year-old chil-
dren  [3] . 
 However, basic and self-referential emotions overlap in 
many other aspects: both are associated with characteris-
tic, stably elicited facial and bodily expression patterns 
even in congenitally blind human beings  [9] , and their 
neurobiological circuits are parallel to and overlapping 
with basic emotions  [10, 11] . 
 The neurofunctional networks involved in basic emo-
tions generally comprise the amygdala, insula, anterior 
cingulate cortex, ventral striatum, prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
and hypothalamus as well as midbrain regions  [12–14] . 
These networks show a wide overlap with respect to va-
lence, and some authors even question any valence speci-
ficity in emotional networks  [15] ; the amygdala, for in-
stance, is more prominently influenced by arousal than by 
valence  [16, 17] . Because fear is strongly associated with 
high arousal, fear seemingly activates the amygdala more 
strongly than other negative and positive emotions  [14] .
 Compared with studies on basic emotions, research on 
the neurofunctional correlates of self-referential emo-
tions is rather sparse. Conceptually, self-referential emo-
tions are composed of: (a) an emotional aspect, at least if 
they are elicited; (b) a self-reflecting, self-evaluating and 
self-conscious aspect; and often (c) a sociocognitive com-
ponent such as violation of social-moral norms and regu-
lation of interpersonal behavior  [2, 18] . Consequently, we 
expected self-referential emotions to activate (a) net-
works involved in the generation of basic emotions, cov-
ering the amygdala, insula and ventral striatum  [19] , (b) 
self-referential networks encompassing cortical midline 
structures and the dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC)  [20–27] , 
and eventually – corresponding to the sociocognitive 
part  – (c) regions associated with evaluation by others 
and theory of mind (ToM; e.g. the superior temporal sul-
cus/temporoparietal junction, lateral prefrontal and pari-
etal regions)  [28, 29] . Until now, studies on self-referen-
tial emotions have either addressed only negative valence 
such as guilt, shame and embarrassment  [30–35] , or only 
positive emotions such as pride compared with joy  [36] . 
To the best of our knowledge, no studies have directly 
compared the neural correlates of positive and negative 
valence in self-referential emotions. Furthermore, most 
studies used sentences or short stories which the partici-
pants had to imagine in order to induce the respective 
emotions. Two studies  [30, 35] assessed and later re-pre-
sented autobiographical situations which contained some 
aspects of guilt, shame or sadness. In this way, this study 
took into account that self-referential emotions are often 
very individual, associated with personal values, events, 
memories and cognitions.
 This method is suitable to elicit positive and negative 
self-referential feelings with relatively high intensity and 
specificity. The current study aimed at comparing the 
neural correlates of positive and negative self-referential 
emotions. Compared with the prior studies  [30, 35] , we 
here defined the time frame for the event as the recent 
past to minimize time- and memory-associated influenc-
es. Subjects chose a situation in which they had felt proud 
and another situation associated with feelings of shame 
or guilt. During functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI), they were instructed to recall and reexperience 
the situation priorly chosen ( fig. 1 ). We aimed at examin-
 Fig. 1. Experimental task: 3 different conditions were presented, 
which consisted of the cued remembrance of a prideful or shame-
ful event or a neutral condition with 12 runs each. Neutral pictures 
served to indicate the end of the periods and as a distractor. 
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ing the valence-specific aspects of self-referential emo-
tions, and in a broad sense compared the neural correlates 
of such internally triggered self-referential emotions with 
a neutral condition. We hypothesized brain activation in 
self-referential brain areas such as the dorsomedial PFC 
(DMPFC) and DLPFC, and in emotion-associated re-
gions such as the amygdala and insula, when comparing 
the emotion conditions with neutral ones. Due to the au-
tobiographical memory component, we also hypothe-
sized activation in the hippocampus and posterior cingu-
late cortex (PCC). We predicted pride to activate brain 
areas associated with positive emotions, such as the ven-
tral striatum  [37, 38] and amygdala  [39] . We hypothe-
sized the shame/guilt condition to increase activity in the 
anterior insula  [40, 41] and amygdala  [42] . We first ana-
lyzed the data in anatomically defined regions of interest 
(ROI; DMPFC, DLPFC, amygdala, anterior insula and 
ventral striatum) as well as in the whole brain. The whole-
brain analysis was done on an exploratory basis.
 Methods 
 Participants 
 Twenty-nine healthy subjects (age: 18–50 years; 16 female) 
were recruited via E-mail advertisements and by word of mouth. 
All participants were right-handed according to a handedness 
scale  [43] . The participants were preassessed with a semistructured 
interview based on the ICD-10 to exclude prior and current neu-
rological and psychiatric illnesses and intake of any medication 
(except for oral contraceptives) or psychotropic substances. Fur-
ther exclusion criteria were: pregnancy; excessive consumption of 
alcohol (>7 units/week), cigarettes (>1 pack/day) and caffeine (>5 
cups/day); and contraindication to fMRI. The study was approved 
by the local ethics committee and was conducted in compliance 
with the Declaration of Helsinki  [44] . All participants gave their 
written informed consent. Immediately after scanning, the par-
ticipants were systematically asked about their performance on the 
task in a qualitative postexperimental interview, with specific ref-
erence to lack of concentration or sleepiness. One subject reported 
sleepiness and was therefore excluded from the analysis, and 3 sub-
jects showed several movement artifacts (sudden head movements 
of >3 mm), such that, in total, 4 subjects had to be excluded. The 
included subjects confirmed that they were able to follow the in-
structions. In total, 25 subjects were included in the analysis.
 Experimental Design 
 The subjects underwent fMRI while performing a task com-
prising 3 conditions in a pseudorandom order: remembrance of an 
event in which the subject felt ashamed or guilty (‘shame’ condi-
tion); remembrance of an event associated with feelings of pride 
(‘pride’ condition); and a neutral waiting condition (‘neutral’ con-
dition). Prior to scanning, the subjects were instructed to choose 1 
situation between 3 weeks and 6 months ago in which they had felt 
ashamed/guilty or proud, and which they remembered vividly and 
easily. During fMRI, simple visual cues indicated to the partici-
pants to recall and reexperience the respective situations ( fig. 1 ). 
Compared with previous studies which provided the participants 
with external, experimenter-chosen stimuli as anchors for remem-
brance, the method used here was easy for the participants because 
it included only 1 personally prechosen situation. For the ‘neutral’ 
condition, the subjects were instructed to await the upcoming pic-
ture. The time frame of 3 weeks to 6 months for the situation to be 
remembered was chosen according to pretests to reduce effects of 
differences in ‘nearness’ and vividness of events and therefore of 
differing emotional activation between the conditions. The peri-
ods for the conditions were initiated by an indicating cue and end-
ed by presenting a distracting neutral picture ( fig. 1 ). The instruct-
ing cues (pride  ▲ , shame/guilt  ▼ , and neutral ◼) were presented 
for 1 s. Including this cue, the conditions lasted a period of 11,880 
ms, equivalent to 6 TR (repetition time for the fMRI volumes). 
Thereafter, as a stop signal, distracting neutral pictures from the 
International Affective Picture System  [45] were presented for 
3,960 ms (2 TR). Then a baseline period of 8 TR followed until the 
next trial was started. In total, each condition occurred 12 times in 
a randomized order (total task duration: about 21 min). The sym-
bols were easily understandable, so that no interfering working 
memory activity had to be used. Intentionally, the task further did 
not comprise an interfering decisional or motor reaction compo-
nent. The task was programmed and presented with Presenta-
tion TM (Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, N.Y., USA).
 Image Acquisition 
 Imaging was performed with a 3.0-tesla GE Signa TM HD Scan-
ner (GE Medical Systems, Milwaukee, Wisc., USA; 8-channel head 
coil). Echo-planar imaging was performed for fMRI (TR/TE: 
1,980/32 ms; 22 sequential axial slices, whole brain; slice thickness: 
3.5 mm; 1-mm gap; resulting voxel size: 3.125 × 3.125 × 4.5 mm; 
matrix: 64 × 64; field of view: 200 mm; flip angle: 70°); 676 volumes 
were obtained per subject, 16 per trial. The first 4 volumes were 
discarded to allow for T2 equilibration effects. High-resolution 
3-D T1-weighted anatomical volumes were acquired (TR/TE: 
9.9/2.9 ms; matrix size: 256 × 256; 1 × 1 × 1 mm resolution; axial 
orientation) for coregistration with the functional data. T2-weight-
ed images in parallel to the echo-planar imaging sequence were 
acquired to exclude possible T2-sensitive abnormalities. The stim-
uli were presented via digital video goggles (Resonance Technolo-
gies, Northridge, Calif., USA).
 Data Analysis 
 The fMRI data were analyzed using BrainVoyager TM QX 2.3.0 
(Brain Innovation, Maastricht, The Netherlands)  [46] . Preprocess-
ing of the functional scans included motion correction, slice scan 
time correction, high-frequency temporal filtering and removal of 
linear trends, as has been described before  [47] . Functional images 
were superimposed on the 2-D anatomical images and incorpo-
rated into 3-D data sets. The individual 3-D data sets were trans-
formed into Talairach space  [48] , resulting in a voxel size of 3 × 3 × 
3 mm, and then spatially smoothed with an 8-mm gaussian kernel 
for subsequent group analysis. Four predictors representing the 3 
conditions and the distractor (shame, pride, neutral, presentation 
of neutral picture) were used to build the design matrix. Single tri-
als with fMRI signal artifacts of more than 3 times the mean signal 
change amplitude (e.g. due to head movements) were eliminated. 
The periods were modeled as epochs using a two-gamma hemo-
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dynamic response function adapted to the applied period duration 
provided by BrainVoyager.
 The fMRI data analysis, based on the general linear model, 
comprised the following steps. First, fixed-effects analyses were 
calculated separately for each subject for the 3 contrasts, compar-
ing the 3 conditions ‘pride versus shame’, ‘shame versus neutral’ 
and ‘pride versus neutral’, resulting in summary images. The sum-
mary images were subjected to second-level analyses within the 
anatomically predefined ROI. Bilateral cubic ROI were positioned 
in the DMPFC, DLPFC, anterior insula, amygdala and ventral stri-
atum according to the respective literature (Talairach coordinates 
and volumes are given in  table  1 ). According to anatomy, the 
DMPFC ROI each measured 12 × 12 × 12 mm (resulting volume: 
1,728 mm 3 ) and the DLPFC ROI 15 × 15 × 15 mm (volume: 
3,375 mm 3 ). Both ROI were based on previous studies  [20, 49] . For 
the amygdala, cubic ROI with an edge length of 10 mm (volume: 
1,000 mm 3 ) were centered according to the Talairach Daemon 
 [50] . The ROI in the anterior insula were based on the existing lit-
erature (15 × 15 × 15 mm; volume: 3,375 mm 3 )  [40, 51] , as were 
the ROI in the ventral striatum (10 × 10 × 10 mm; volume: 
1,000 mm 3 )  [52, 53] . From these ROI, the mean β-weights for each 
subject and each condition were extracted. With the β-weights, we 
calculated a one-factorial ANOVA with the factors ‘task condition’ 
and ‘ROI’ using SPSS version 20. In those ROI where the overall F 
test was significant, the contrasts ‘pride versus shame’, ‘shame ver-
sus neutral’ and ‘pride versus neutral’ were calculated with Bonfer-
roni correction for multiple comparisons.
 In addition, we performed exploratory whole-brain random-
effects analyses for each of the 3 contrasts. For the contrast ‘pride 
versus shame’, the voxel-wise statistical threshold was set to p < 
0.001 with a cluster threshold of 5 voxels of 3 × 3 × 3 mm 
(135  mm 3 ), as suggested before  [54] , to avoid too many false 
negatives. For the more basic contrasts ‘pride versus neutral’ and 
‘shame versus neutral’ and for the conjoined contrast ‘(pride vs. 
neutral) plus (shame vs. neutral)’, the threshold was set to p < 
0.0001 with the same cluster threshold of 135 mm 3 . Anatomical 
regions were identified based on the Talairach atlas  [48] and Ta-
lairach Daemon  [50] .
 Questionnaires 
 For general psychometric characterization, the participants 
completed a Self-Rating Depression Scale (SDS)  [55] , and for state 
and trait anxiety, the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory  [56] . After the 
task, all participants were interviewed about their ability to re-
member and to reexperience the 2 chosen situations. To avoid too 
intensive intrusion and possible embarrassment, we intentionally 
did not ask the subjects about the specific content of the situation, 
but only openly about the time since the event and the specific 
emotion and circumstances (e.g. type of emotion elicited, pride/
shame due to own appraisal or due to others’ appraisals and com-
ments). The participants could name more than 1 emotion per 
condition or event, and could describe self-appraisal or appraisal 
by others freely and in parallel. All subjects confirmed that they 
were able to remember and imagine each one event vividly. How-
ever, due to technical reasons, the detailed interview results were 
only available from 18 of the 25 participants included. Question-
naires were analyzed using SPSS version 20; the significance level 
was set at p < 0.05.
 Results 
 Behavioral Results 
 The included participants (9 male, 16 female) were of 
a mean age of 31.9 years (standard deviation, SD: 10.2 
years; range: 21–50 years). The mean score on the SDS 
was 35.5 (SD: 7.27), the mean state anxiety score 33.3 (SD: 
7.02), and the mean trait anxiety score 31.6 (SD: 6.52). 
Thus, the participants’ ratings corresponded to SDS and 
state anxiety norms in the general population, only trait 
anxiety was slightly lower  [57, 58] .
 The mean time passed since the remembered event 
was reported to be 6.2 ± 6.6 weeks (±SD) in the positive 
Table 1.  ROI analysis
Talairach x/y/z F(72, 2); p Shame/guilt > neutral, p1 Pride > neutral, p1 Pride > shame/guilt, p1
Anterior insula – left –34/13/4 17.27; <0.001 <0.0001 <0.0001 n.s.
Anterior insula – right 34/13/4 4.98; 0.009 0.0092 0.0960 n.s.
DMPFC – left –6/6/50 27.51; <0.001 <0.0001 <0.0001 n.s.
DMPFC – right 6/6/50 15.74; <0.001 <0.0001 <0.0001 n.s.
DLPFC – left –42/10/34 6.90; 0.002 0.0086 0.0041 n.s.
DLPFC – right 42/10/34 2.55; 0.085 – – –
Ventral striatum – left –9/6/6 7.50; 0.001 0.0212 0.0011 n.s.
Ventral striatum – right 9/6/6 6.44; 0.003 0.0282 0.0032 n.s.
Amygdala – left –19/–5/–17 3.25; 0.045 n.s. 0.0494 n.s.
Amygdala – right 19/–5/–17 2.68; 0.075 – – 0.084
 Given is F of the one-factorial ANOVA and p of the respective contrasts. Significant contrasts are marked in italics. Contrasts were 
calculated using the mean β-weights of the respective ROI. x/y/z = Talairach coordinates of the center of the cubic ROI.
1 Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
: 
Un
ive
rs
itä
t Z
ür
ich
,  
Ze
nt
ra
lb
ib
lio
th
ek
 Z
ür
ich
   
   
   
 
13
0.
60
.4
7.
22
 - 
6/
3/
20
16
 2
:5
4:
42
 P
M
 Brain Activation Associated with Pride 
and Shame 
Neuropsychobiology 2014;69:95–106
DOI: 10.1159/000358090
99
and 7.7 ± 9.9 weeks in the negative condition (paired Stu-
dent’s t test: t = 0.526, p = 0.606, not significant). In the 
positive condition, 97% of the participants reported pride 
as the elicited emotion, 63% joy. In the negative condi-
tion, 92% of the participants reported shame, 37% guilt 
and 63% feelings of failure. In 87% of the participants, the 
positive situation was associated with self-evaluation (‘I 
did well according to my own values’), in 40% with praise 
by others. In the negative condition, the situation was 
mostly associated with negative evaluation by others 
(76%) and to a lesser degree with negative self-evaluation 
(58%). Between the conditions, the degree of self-evalua-
tion was significantly higher in the positive condition 
than in the negative condition (t  = 2.357, p  = 0.030), 
whereas the negative condition was significantly more as-
sociated with evaluations by others compared with the 
positive condition (t = 3.071, p = 0.007).
 Brain Activity Associated with Pride and Shame in 
Selected ROI 
 Pride and shame/guilt compared with the neutral con-
dition showed comparable activation bilaterally in the 
DMPFC, bilaterally in the ventral striatum, and in the left 
anterior insula and left DLPFC ( table 1 ). The left amyg-
dala was significantly activated only by the contrast ‘pride 
vs. neutral’, whereas the right anterior insula was active 
with the contrast ‘shame/guilt vs. neutral’, with only a 
trend in the ‘pride vs. neutral’ contrast. With correction 
for multiple comparisons, we found no significant activa-
tion in the right DLPFC. When comparing pride and 
shame/guilt directly, the ANOVA revealed no significant 
difference. There was only a trend for a difference in the 
right amygdala, which was otherwise not significantly dif-
ferently activated ( fig. 2 ).
 Brain Activation in Whole-Brain Analysis 
 The comparison of pride with shame/guilt in the 
whole-brain analysis ( table  2 ) was associated with in-
creased activation cortically in the left superior frontal 
gyrus (FG) and the left medial FG within the ventrome-
dial PFC, as well as with activation in the middle and PCC 
( fig. 3 b) and the inferior temporal and parietal gyrus, and 
subcortically in the left caudate body and lateral thala-
mus. Shame/guilt activated no brain region significantly 
stronger than pride ( table 2 ).
 Comparing pride with the neutral condition ( table 3 ) 
was associated with increased activity in the left superior 
and medial FG as part of the MPFC ( fig. 3 a), in the left 
 Fig. 2. Bar chart depicting the mean 
β-weights of the ROI analysis (±SD). Loca-
tion and size of the ROI are given in  table 1 . 
L = Left; R = right. 
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Table 2.  Activated regions in whole-brain analysis of contrast ‘pride versus shame/guilt’
Anatomic regions Talairach coordinates x/y/z Cluster size, mm3 tmax pmax
Pride vs. shame/guilt
Superior FG – left (BA 6)
Medial FG – left (BA 10)
Cingulate gyrus – left/right (BA 31)
PCC – right (BA 30)
Inferior temporal gyrus – left (BA 37)
Inferior parietal lobe – left (BA 39)
Caudate body – left
Lateral thalamus – left
Shame/guilt vs. pride
–19/16/60 212 4.490 0.000152
–4/55/6 473 4.747 0.000079
–4/–35/30 2,067 6.533 0.000001
29/–29/33 358 4.499 0.000148
–55/–44/–18 357 4.701 0.000089
–34/–68/30 985 4.738 0.000081
–10/–11/24 779 4.860 0.000059
–22/–20/–3 1,312 4.599 0.000115
no significant regions – – –
 Given are the Talairach coordinates of peak activation; p < 0.001; cluster threshold: 135 mm3. BA = Brodmann area.
 Fig. 3. Color bars (colors online only) represent t values. Right column: average time course of activation (with standard errors). Gray 
vertical lines: marking task periods. The Talairach x-coordinates indicate the location of the sagittal section.  a Activation in the medial 
PFC in the contrast ‘pride vs. neutral’ (p < 0.0001). The contrast ‘shame vs. neutral’ resulted in a nearly identical activation at the same 
statistical threshold.  b  Activation in the PCC in the contrast ‘pride vs. shame’ (p < 0.001). 
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middle FG and precentral gyrus within the DLPFC, in the 
left insula and inferior FG as part of the ventrolateral PFC, 
in the left PCC, and subcortically in the left bed nucleus 
of the stria terminalis as part of the extended amygdala 
and in the left lateral thalamus extending to the caudate 
body.
 Shame/guilt compared with neutral ( table 3 ) was sim-
ilarly associated with activity in the left medial FG 
( fig. 3 a) extending to the anterior cingulate cortex and 
with activity in the superior and middle FG as well as the 
precentral gyrus, all belonging to the DLPFC. Further-
more, the insula and inferior FG were more active bilat-
erally with shame/guilt, as well as, additionally, the left 
PCC and lingual gyrus, and subcortically the ventral stri-
atum and caput of the caudate, both belonging to the 
lentiform nucleus. In this contrast, we detected a de-
creased activation in the right supramarginal gyrus and 
in the right superior parietal lobule with shame/guilt 
compared with neutral. The conjoined contrast identify-
ing those brain regions activated by both self-referential 
conditions versus neutral ( table 3 ) resulted in increased 
activation in the MPFC and left PCC and in the left in-
sula and left premotor cortex.
 Discussion 
 The aim of our study was to investigate the neuronal 
correlates of the positive and negative self-referential 
emotions pride and shame/guilt with particular regard to 
valence when specifically evoked by the remembrance of 
individual autobiographical events. Both conditions acti-
vated brain regions involved in self-referential processing 
such as the MPFC and PCC  [20, 59] , as well as emotion-
Table 3.  Activation in whole-brain analysis of contrasts of self-referential emotions versus neutral
Anatomic region Talairach coordinates 
x/y/z
Cluster size, 
mm3
tmax pmax
Pride vs. neutral
Medial/superior FG – left (BA 6)
Middle FG/precentral gyrus – left (DLPFC; BA 6)
Inferior FG/insula – left (BA 13)
PCC – left (BA 30)
Precuneus – left (BA 31)
Extended amygdala/BNST – left
Lateral thalamus/caudate body
Neutral vs. pride
Shame/guide vs. neutral
Medial FG/anterior cingulate – left (BA 6)
Superior FG – left (BA 10)
Middle FG/precentral gyrus – left (DLPFC; BA 6)
Inferior FG/insula – left (BA 45, 13)
Insula – right (BA 13)
PCC – left (BA 30)
Lingual gyrus – left (BA 19)
Lentiform nucleus – left/ventral striatum
Lentiform nucleus – left/caudate head
Neutral vs. shame/guilt
Supramarginal gyrus – right (BA 40)
Superior parietal lobule – right (BA 7)
Conjunction analysis (shame/guilt vs. neutral) and (pride vs. neutral) 
Medial FG/anterior cingulate cortex – left (BA 6/32)
PCC – left (BA 30)
Insula – left (BA 13)
Precentral gyrus – left (BA 6)
–10/–5/57 6,552 7.912 <0.000001
–40/–8/57 2,790 6.639 0.000001
–40/7/9 1,800 5.711 0.000007
–19/–53/12 1,973 5.900 0.000004
–10/–68/21 829 5.577 0.00001
–16/–2/–3 197 5.553 0.00001
–28/–20/27 1,663 5.200 0.000025
no significant regions
–7/1/54 4,168 6.781 0.000001
–19/49/21 184 5.219 0.000024
–37/–5/54 696 5.477 0.000012
–58/19/9 5,905 6.352 0.000001
47/13/6 1,397 6.092 0.000003
–19/–50/9 2,775 5.277 0.000021
–10/–56/–15 1,247 5.599 0.000009
–19/4/0 214 5.528 0.000011
–22/1/21 136 5.067 0.000035
44/–38/36 512 5.205 0.000025
29/–65/42 233 5.567 0.00001
–7/4/51 6,209 6.587 0.000001
–13/–59/9 2,306 5.352 0.000015
–43/10/12 2,234 6.032 0.000003
–37/–8/57 275 5.113 0.000028
 Given are the Talairach coordinates of peak activation; p < 0.0001; cluster threshold: 135 mm3. BA = Brodmann area; BNST = bed 
nucleus of stria terminalis; DLPFC = dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; FG = frontal gyrus; PCC = posterior cingulate cortex.
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related brain regions such as the insula, amygdala and 
ventral striatum  [13, 60] .
 When comparing pride and shame/guilt directly, in 
the whole-brain analysis pride was associated with stron-
ger brain activity than shame/guilt, particularly in brain 
regions involved in emotion processing, such as the left 
amygdala. Activation of the left ventral striatum, which is 
known to be implicated in the processing of hedonic 
stimuli  [61, 62] and in reward processing  [63, 64] , could 
be a correlate of positive emotions and perhaps even plea-
sure which is associated with the remembrance of a pride-
ful event. However, we found no difference between pride 
and shame/guilt in the ventral striatum. Activation of the 
ventral striatum with aversive stimuli  [61] , with disgust 
and fear  [65] and with pain  [66] has been shown before, 
and there is an ongoing debate on a function of the nu-
cleus accumbens as a behaviorally activating system 
which motivates the individual to either approach or 
withdraw from an object  [67] . Therefore, our findings are 
in line with the presumption that the ventral striatum is 
involved in the identification of salience and the produc-
tion of affective or motivational states  [68] beyond re-
ward. In parallel to the ventral striatum, pride involved 
the left amygdala more strongly than did shame/guilt. 
The amygdala is central for the processing of emotional 
information  [19, 68–71] . Amygdala activation has been 
associated with negative emotion, particularly with fear 
and also with sadness and disgust  [15, 65, 72] , but also 
with pleasant emotional and reward-related stimuli  [15, 
39, 73] . Furthermore, studies rather point to a correlation 
of amygdala activity with arousal than with valence  [16, 
70] . In contrast with other studies  [74] , here the amyg-
dala was not more active in the negative than in the posi-
tive condition, but rather conversely. This difference 
could be explained by the nature of emotional stimula-
tion, which in our study was created by the subjects them-
selves and by their engagement and ability to remember 
and relive the respective events. According to a known 
self-positivity bias  [18] , healthy participants encode and 
remember positive self-referential information better 
than negative information. This could have caused more 
pride-associated activation in emotion-processing brain 
regions such as the amygdala and ventral striatum.
 The pattern of activation in the bilateral anterior in-
sula supports the suggestion that pride and shame/guilt 
involved brain regions similarly to basic emotional stim-
uli  [75] . The left insula was active in both conditions, 
whereas the right insula was less active with pride, al-
though a significant difference between pride and shame/
guilt was lacking. The insula is known to be involved in 
the generation of affective states in response to emotive 
stimuli of both negative and positive valence  [68, 76, 77] , 
as well as of pain  [68, 78] . Previous studies have also 
shown insular activation during the experience of guilt 
and shame  [30, 35] and associated the insula more strong-
ly with negative emotional valence and, particularly, anx-
iety  [79, 80] . Taken together, the parallel involvement of 
the insular cortex in both self-referential emotions with a 
mild overweight in the negative condition in our study 
could reflect emotional arousal. In summary, pride and 
shame/guilt were activated in our study networks simi-
larly to basic emotions.
 In our study, the self-referential aspect of pride and 
shame was reflected by the strong bilateral activation in 
the DMPFC, anatomically defined, and in the whole-
brain analyses. The DMPFC is part of the cortical midline 
structures, which are supposed to be core structures of 
self-referential processing  [20] . We found no differential 
activation in the DMPFC with pride and with shame/
guilt. This could correlate with the similar degree of self-
reference of these conditions. However, the study by 
Takahashi et al.  [36] on pride found no involvement of 
the MPFC, whereas 4 other studies did  [30–32, 34] . All of 
these authors interpreted the function of the MPFC pri-
marily as a neural substrate of social cognition or ToM. 
This interpretation could be justified by some aspects of 
the specific tasks (such as to imagine being in the de-
scribed situation, which means to put oneself into the po-
sition of someone). However, the ‘stimuli’ in the current 
study were completely self-generated and based on indi-
vidual memories, whereas any interference due to exter-
nal stimuli or external monitoring – and particularly 
marked ToM aspects – were excluded. This supports 
more the self-referential, relatively valence-independent 
function of the DMPFC than ToM, social transgression 
and judgement aspects (although we did not control for 
the involvement of the DMPFC in ToM). This is backed 
up by a study on the neural basis of human social values 
 [33] which found higher activation within the ventral 
MPFC during self-agency conditions such as pride and 
guilt compared with other-agency conditions such as 
gratitude and anger – however, without a strong effect of 
valence in the MPFC. The same reasons could explain 
why the current study lacks activation in the characteris-
tic regions involved in social cognition or ToM, such as 
the posterior superior temporal sulcus and temporal 
poles  [81–83] .
 The PCC activation during pride and shame in our 
study could be explained by the aspect of autobiographi-
cal remembrance of our task. The PCC is involved in en-
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coding and retrieving autobiographical memory  [20, 84, 
85] . A previous study on guilt-specific processing using 
autobiographical memory found similar PCC activation 
as in the current study  [30] . When comparing pride and 
shame/guilt, the PCC here was more active in the positive 
condition. This could be explained again by a general 
proneness to positive self-relevant stimuli and memories 
in healthy individuals (positivity bias)  [18] , even if the 
participants showed no marked difference in perceived 
vividness of the positive and negative memories. In the 
two self-referential conditions, the explorative whole-
brain analysis revealed activation in brain regions associ-
ated with visual imagery, such as the lingual gyrus and 
precuneus, and in areas associated with verbal processing, 
such as the left inferior FG. These findings are consistent 
with the supposition of visual and verbal imagination 
during the remembrance task  [86] . One might perhaps 
have expected to find activation in the hippocampal re-
gion during remembrance of the events. Only half of the 
studies addressing neural circuits of self-referential emo-
tions found activation in the hippocampal region  [31–
33] , and even in these studies, hippocampal activation 
was not consistent (in none of these studies was guilt as-
sociated with hippocampal activation, only embarrass-
ment or shame or pride was). The other studies  [30, 34–
36] detected no hippocampal activation in self-referential 
emotional conditions. Regarding models of autobio-
graphical memory, a recent meta-analysis of studies on 
self-referential memory processes detected no significant 
hippocampal activation  [87] . Furthermore, the hippo-
campus might be more sensitive to concrete contextual 
aspects versus scenic emotional memories  [88] , and to 
remote versus recent events  [89] .
 In the DLPFC ROI and whole-brain analysis, we found 
only an activation of the left DLPFC during the two self-
referential conditions, which in the whole-brain analysis 
was stronger with pride than with shame/guilt. The 
 DLPFC is involved in a number of neuropsychological 
functions such as executive functions (planning, execu-
tion of actions)  [90] , reasoning, action inhibition, work-
ing memory and attention  [91–94] , which involve not 
only separate but also overlapping parts of the DLPFC. 
One meta-analysis associated the MPFC more strongly 
with emotional processes, whereas the DLPFC was more 
active with cognitive tasks  [95] . Emotion regulation pro-
cesses also involve the DLPFC with a right-lateralized 
preponderance  [96, 97] . Furthermore, studies on de-
pressed patients predominantly detected hypoactivity of 
the left and hyperactivity of the right DLPFC  [98–101] . In 
healthy subjects, an imbalance between right and left 
DLPFC, with a left-lateralized association with positive 
valence and a right-lateralized association with negative 
valence, has been postulated  [102, 103] . However, our 
study revealed no such valence-specific lateralization of 
DLPFC activity. One prior study on self-referential emo-
tions described bilateral activation of superior and mid-
dle FG corresponding to the DLPFC with shame-related 
processing  [32] , whereas Wagner et al.  [30] found lower 
activation of the right DLPFC with guilt and shame com-
pared with the non-self-referential sadness condition 
( [30] , supplementary material). The other studies on self-
referential emotions described no prominent activation 
of the DLPFC  [31, 33, 34, 36] . One explanation for the 
involvement of the DLPFC in the current study could rely 
on cognitive processes (remembrance vs. simple expecta-
tion in the neutral condition).
 Regarding the discussion on the differentiation of 
shame and guilt, the participants in the current study re-
ported shame more often than guilt; only 1 participant 
reported no shame. Therefore, these results cannot con-
tribute to this discussion. In addition to the hypotheses 
given above, the self-focus associated with shame could 
account for the lack of activation in other-referential tem-
poroparietal and lateral orbitofrontal brain regions in our 
study.
 The open and noncontrolled instruction in our study 
could be regarded as a limitation, because we could not 
explicitly control whether the participants indeed re-
membered situations associated with pride and shame or 
guilt as they were instructed. However, we regard just this 
as a major strength of our design, i.e. that we did not in-
terfere with the individual memories and personal feel-
ings. Such interference can and will occur for instance 
with real-time monitoring of mood or emotions. By using 
this design, it was possible to let the participants immerse 
themselves in very personal and individual memories and 
the associated unpleasant emotions, even if we as experi-
menters could not control this completely. However, we 
interviewed the participants rather explicitly (neverthe-
less avoiding disclosure of the content of the memory it-
self) about the vividness and type of the elicited emotion, 
and whether the situation contained more evaluation 
from other people or from themselves. We found no clear 
difference between the two conditions with regard to self-
reported vividness in this interview. However, due to the 
subjective nature of the events, we did not conduct a 
quantitative analysis of this aspect. Anyway, it might have 
influenced the neural representation of these conditions.
 Another limitation of the current study is that we en-
closed no non-self-referential emotional conditions 
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which could have served as direct controls for valence 
and for disentangling valence from self-reference. This 
could perhaps be done in future studies. This limitation 
applies particularly to the neutral condition, which, 
compared with the two self-referential conditions, was 
much less complex and controlled, in particular not for 
memory-associated processes in the self-referential 
conditions. One specific focus of the current study was 
the evocation of pride and shame by remembrance of 
two individual situations, which is a new approach to 
examining individual self-referential processes. Respec-
tive stimuli associated with individual remembrance, 
but without the self-referential aspect, are difficult to 
develop. We therefore accepted the lack of specific con-
trol conditions for the sake of introducing and testing 
the principle of self-referential, memory-associated 
emotions.
 This study could be the basis for examining these self-
referential emotions in patients in which these emotions 
are less controllable and more influential on everyday life, 
such as patients suffering from a depressive or (hypo)
manic mood episode, in continuation of the pioneering 
study by Green et al.  [104] . Such studies could help in 
identifying the neurobiological differences between well-
contained and rather helpful self-referential emotions in 
healthy subjects and their sometimes overwhelming and 
destructive counterparts in mental disorders, and per-
haps in developing strategies assisting in the treatment of 
these disorders.
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